The Confederate Navy

290 Foundation 

 VERBATIM 

'He is not impressed with the necessity of building ships.' John N. Maffit entered those prophetic words in his diary following a meeting with Jefferson Davis shortly after the civil war began. This future Captain of the commerce raider CSS Florida was one of the first United States naval officers to resign his commission and offer his services to the South; but those ten words made a fitting epitaph for the Confederate States Navy and with it many argue, the Southern cause.

Jefferson Davis never fully appreciated the critical role the Confederate States Navy, especially the Ironclads, would have to play if the South were to survive. From his landlocked point of view, Davis could not understand the importance of sea power. Nevertheless, it is fortunate with hindsight, he was astute enough to appoint his former colleague in the Senate, Stephen Mallory as Secretary of the Navy but not astute enough to give him the full support he needed to help the Confederate Navy realize its full potential.

Mallory's strong desire to see the Confederacy equipped with a substantial and 'competent' navy was at odds with many and by the end of the first year of conflict, the Secretary of the Navy was acutely aware he was competing less favourably for funding from those commanding the (many) southern armies. Army commanders remained confident the war would be short-lived and that opinion - and their expectation was shared (though not desired) by many politicians in the new government! It is not clear what Mallory's point of view in this was; but his determination to realise a susbstantial navy remained, so in an effort to bypass the usual channels; and seemingly more aware of shortfalls to come, Mallory wrote directly to President Davis, laying out in no uncertain terms what would be necessary to further the aims and ambitions of their (Navy's) cause. His letter was as follows:

Confederate States Navy Department

Richmond, March 4th 1862

Sir: 

In response to the resolution of the House of Representatives passed on the 3rd instant, '..that the President be requested to communicate to this body, at the earliest practicable moment, what additional means in money, men, arms and munitions of war are, in his judegement necessary, or may be within the present year, for the public service, including military operations on land and water'.. i have the honor to say that fifty light-draft and powerful steam propellors, plated with 5-inch hard iron, armed and equipped for service in our own waters, four iron or steel-clad single deck, ten gun frigates of about 2,000 tons, and ten clipper propellors with superior marine engines, both classes of ships designed for deep-sea cruising, 3,000 tons of first-class boiler-plate iron, and 1,000 tons of rod, bolt, and bar iron are means which this department could immediately employ with incalculable advantage to the best interests of the country.

To this point in his communication, Mallory was determined to point out the resources he had to hand - but in truth his statement was somewhat embellished in regards of readiness or quantities of materials, no doubt based on the reports received from his immediate subordinates? Now however, Mallory sought to alert Davis to the possibilities a more substantial naval force would bring about. He continues:

Under the head of arms and munitions of war, this Department could immediately employ with equal advantage 2,000 pieces or heavy ordinance, ranging in caliber from 6 to 11 inches, and in weight from 6,000 to 14,000 pounds, 2,000 tons of cannon powder, 1,000 tons of musket powder, for filling projectiles and pyrotechny, 4,000 navy rifles, and 4,000 navy revolvers, and 4,000 navy cutlasses, with their equipments and ammunition.

Mallory however, was very much aware that these quantities were well beyond the resources of the new administration and had already auhtorised lengthy discussion with both European and South American suppliers through his network of purchasing agents and spies. Though an actual number has never been confirmed, it is widely believed that the Navy Secretary had over twelve hundred such men and women acting on his instruction world-wide. Some, like James Dunwoody Bulloch were officially appointed to act on his behalf; but the majority provided their services freely in the belief that the Confederacy would ultimately gain proper recognition and achieve a military victory over the North. Mallory no doubt alerted Davis to the likely shortfalls they would experience in equipment at every opportunity, but in this letter he records for the first (and only time) the numbers of men (additional) needed for his fledgling navy:

We could use with equal advantage 3,000 instructed seamen, and 4,000 ordinary seament and landsmen, and 2,000 first rate mechanics. These means and munitions of war cannot presently be obtained within the Confederacy, and the extent to which they may be supplied [sourced] from abroad, I cannot yet determine.

The crux of Mallory's problems was funding; and this letter to his President provided him with his best opportunity to state unoquivicably the amount he needed for European purchases:

If five millions of dollars were immediately placed in Europe, prudent agents might possibly obtain such means and materials to a certain extent.

I am, respectfully, your obedient servant,

S.R. MALLORY

 Secretary of the Navy

No record of any direct reply to Mallory's letter remains but Davis was obviously less than sympathetic to his demands! Through the good offices of Commodore Duncan Ingraham, commander of all naval forces and Edward M. Tidball, chief clerk, an order was constructed which, by Act of Congress on April 21st 1862, provided details for the man-powering of the navy, albeit at a level far below that which Mallory desired. None-the-less, Mallory did receive 'promise' for enough funding (directly and indirectly) to pursue a programme of equipment that enabled his department to enter into innumerable contracts for gunboats to be built on the Pamunkey, York, Tombigee, Pedee and other rivers. However, the first, major setback for Mallory's infant Confederate navy, came with this allocation. From April 1861 to August 1862, congress made-over $330M to the army but less than $15M was budgeted for the navy. To make matters worse, Mallory initially did not have direct control of his funding. After negotiating with contractors at home or agents overseas for purchases, he had to apply to the Treasury Department for payment, adding further layers of unnecessary bureaucracy. Despite these inconveniences, between April 1861 and April 1865, the South managed to launch over two-dozen Ironclads and during that same period, laid down or contracted for another thirty-six. This was in addition to numerous conventional warships, commercial ships and river steamers, blockade-runners, commerce raiders, gunboats and smaller craft. A prodigious effort considering the extremely limited shipbuilding and industrial capacity of the South in 1861. Records show many of the above were burned before their completion and payment to contractors for raw materials and manpower never paid. Throughout, there remained the problems associated with procurement of propellors, boilers and engines, as those designs to hand lacked sufficient power and endurance and would render this new fleet, inefficient at best. Mallory realised the industrial resources of the south would be directed towards supporting the army for the foreseable future, so he directed his attention to the one proven source of both ships and machinery - Great Britain!

To implement his strategy, Mallory quickly organized the Confederate Navy into four offices. These offices were equivalent to the bureaus of the United States Navy with which he was familiar. The Office of Provisions and Clothing responsibilities included manufacturing, acquiring and distributing uniforms and equipment to the Navy. It also acted as Paymaster to all Officers, sailors, contractors and civilian employees. The Office of Medicine and Surgery saw to the health of the sailors and set up Naval Hospitals. The Office of Orders and Detail oversaw the Navy's paperwork, made personnel assignments and set personnel policies. Lastly, the Office of Ordnance and Hydrography was charged with design, construction and armament of naval vessels. Later, as the war evolved, a Submarine Battery Service was added to develop and fully employ torpedo (mine) warfare. Lastly, a 'Secret Service' was added to the Navy Department. This office was not concerned with gathering military intelligence as its name might indicate. Its function involved the aforementioned procurment of warships, associated supplies and equipment from abroad. (Mallory, it must be said, did not favor privateering because it alienated the English and would in his view, erode their support). In a sereious attempt to regulate this maritime segment of the war effort, Mallory organized all personnel into Regular Navy, Volunteer Navy or Provisional Navy billets. This done, he now turned his attention back to the thorny issue of finding suitable ships...